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This article analyzes Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the characteristics of the 
environment in which the program is nested. These characteristics include Pakistan’s 
history of internal and external instability; nuclear saber rattling during crises; support for 
Islamic terrorism in order to advance state goals; indigenous production of many 
elements of its nuclear forces; possession of delivery and command and control systems 
with destabilizing characteristics; and finally, nuclear doctrine that appears to advocate 
first use of nuclear weapons. The article argues that the characteristics of Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program generate threats to US national security interests. The article 
examines six interrelated and synergistic challenges for US national security: first, 
Pakistan is engaged in an arms race in Southwest Asia that has negative implications for 
Pakistan’s stability; second, the threat of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan continues; 
third, Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics make accidental and/or unauthorized nuclear war 
more likely; fourth, there is an ongoing possibility of war with India; fifth, Islamist 
influence is spreading through key sectors of Pakistani society; and finally, there is an 
increasing danger of state failure in Pakistan. 
 




 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program generates concern in Washington and among 
its allies for a variety of reasons. There are concerns about the potential of nuclear war 
with India, about proliferation, and about seizure by Islamist militants. These concerns 
are legitimate to be sure. But a close examination of the program itself and the 
environment in which that program nests raises a larger concern: the likelihood of a 
synergistic interaction among these variables leading to even greater danger to US 
security. This malevolent manifestation of unintended outcomes cannot be predicted, but 
the way in which these dangers arise can be better understood. To this end, the article 
examines the environment in which Pakistan’s program nests, how these environmental 
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variables may interact, what sorts of dangers may arise therefrom, and how these 
variables and dangers might themselves interact synergistically, leading to even greater 
peril. The resulting hazards are more difficult to understand, less predictable, and thus 
pose an even greater threat to US security than generally acknowledged. Because the 
threats generated are more likely to have unintended consequences, it is more important 
than ever to plan for coherent, interconnected responses. 
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES 
 To best understand Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, it is essential to 
understand Pakistan’s relationship with India. Pakistan’s relationship with India is 
perhaps more complicated than the relationship United States shares with any state, 
including nuclear-armed states. Pakistan and India were born together of the 
subcontinent. And as a sibling rivalry can be far more complex than any “normal” rivalry, 
so too is the rivalry between Pakistan and India. India is, first and foremost, far larger and 
more powerful than Pakistan. Nothing can change this geopolitical and economic fact, 
though Pakistan does hope to mute this difference through the possession of nuclear 




  Pakistan and India have also fought three major wars since 1947. In each 
of these wars Pakistan suffered defeat on some level. In the 1971 war particularly, 
Pakistan saw itself dismembered, with its eastern portion being granted independence as 
Bangladesh. The result of this war made clear to Pakistani elites that they could not hope 
to defeat or even fight India to a draw if India sought to fully impose its will. In the 
immediate aftermath of the 1971 war, Pakistan decided to move forward decisively and 
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develop nuclear weapons over all other national goals including economic development, 
political development, and conventional military development.
2
 Since then, Pakistan has 
become proficient at asymmetrical warfare at both ends of the spectrum, whether through 
the development of nuclear weapons or by developing more traditional asymmetrical 
power such as terrorism and the use of irregulars. 
 Religious differences help explain the deep animosity between Pakistan and India. 
Pakistan has always seen Islam as part and parcel of its national identity. But the intensity 
of these religious feelings, and the distance to which elites have been willing to go to take 
advantage of religion, have increased markedly over time. Initially, Pakistani elites 
sought to minimize the involvement of religion with state. But as the country faced 
pressures, both internal and external, religion became the one unifying feature that elites 
could turn to and increasingly they did just that. Religion was a way of uniting Pakistanis 
against India as well as a way of garnering external support. When the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan, religion was again invoked (with US encouragement) to rally 
Muslims from around the world against the Soviets.
3
 Pakistan has also used “jihad” to 
wage irregular war against India in Kashmir. Pakistan’s military governments too have 
used religion against domestic foes, especially pro-democracy groups.
4
 Finally, India in 
the late 1990s itself began to increasingly use religion as a method of mobilizing the 
masses. Thus Hindu fundamentalism, as manifested in the nationalistic BJP in India, met 
Islamic fundamentalism.
5
 These religious tensions therefore expanded beyond the 
disputed Kashmir region where they had previously been central and began to take center 
stage in many facets of the states’ relations. This is particularly disturbing for nuclear 
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deterrence theory because religious differences are often perceived as zero-sum. The 
Indo-Pakistani hostility has manifested itself most dangerously during nuclear crises. 
NUCLEAR CRISES 
 Since the 1980s, the relationship between Pakistan and India has stumbled from 
one crisis after another. These crises have been characterized by nuclear brinkmanship. 
Though such nuclear brinkmanship was implicit in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, by 
the late 1990s and early in the 21
st
 century such brinkmanship had become explicit. At 
least for Pakistan’s military this brinkmanship evidences successful nuclear deterrence of 
its more powerful neighbor.
6
  
 The Brasstacks crisis of 1986-1987 arose out of a large-scale November 1986 
India training exercise close to Pakistan’s border in Rajastan (a likely Indian jumping off 
point for any future war with Pakistan). The exercises were of unprecedented size and 
included most of India’s armored formations. Tactical nuclear weapons were included in 
the exercises. Pakistan viewed the exercises as threatening (indeed they could have been 
a cover for military strikes) and responded with its own large scale exercises near Punjab. 
Each state thereafter engaged in further threatening maneuvers heightening the crisis. In 
January 1987 A.Q. Khan allegedly revealed to the press that Pakistan had enriched 
uranium and could simulate a nuclear weapons test. The article that contained Khan’s 
comments was not published until 1 March, by which time the crisis had started to wind 
down. Still, the Khan threat is widely perceived in Pakistan as having been a successful 
threat of nuclear weapons use against India. Additionally, Pakistan “reportedly made a 
veiled nuclear threat to the Indian ambassador in Islamabad in an effort to contain and 
defuse the crisis.”7 Moreover, there are reports that India intended a preventative attack 
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against Pakistan at this time to foreclose Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons. 
Whatever the veracity of these reports, they are widely accepted in Pakistan. Thus the 
lesson Pakistan’s military drew from Brasstacks was that nuclear threats work. For the 
purposes of this article the perceptions in Pakistan of how this crisis was resolved are just 
as important as the reality.
8
 
 In early 1990 another crisis occurred, this time in Kashmir. Although one might 
argue Kashmir is in a perpetual state of crisis, in this particular case it was a combination 
of ongoing tensions within Kashmir, a violent Indian crackdown, and an increase in 
Pakistani-sponsored militant activity (as well as a failure to withdraw Pakistani troops 
who participated in earlier exercises in the area), which in turn led to an Indian military 
build-up not just in Kashmir but also south into Punjab.
9
 In February India also deployed 
units for armored exercises far to the southwest in Rajasthan, evoking images of 
Brasstacks.
10
 Pakistan’s leadership responded itself with a further troop build-up. 
Tensions increased, additional units were deployed and/or alerted, and once again the 
possibility of uncontrolled escalation loomed.
11
  Some have minimized this crisis, noting 
that much of the Indian deployment was infantry-based and directed at stopping cross-
border infiltration from Pakistan into Kashmir.
12
 But the deployments went beyond 
Kashmir and in any event it is not clear that Pakistani intelligence interpreted the Indian 
build-up in this fashion. In March and April the capitals exchanged threats, including 
some that later observers have interpreted as nuclear.
13
 By mid-April Pakistan believed 
“India had deployed a strike force of up to 100,000 men within fifty miles of the border 
in Rajasthan.”14 This southwestern deployment raised the possibility of a decapitating 
attack designed to split Pakistan or at least prevent the movement of troops toward 
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Kashmir in the northeast. Again some observers assert that, notwithstanding such 
deployments, neither side deployed the armor necessary to support such a strike.
15
 
 Whatever the actual deployments, leaders in the United States were growing 
concerned. A US diplomatic mission was sent to both India and Pakistan in May 1990 
and by June 1990 the crisis had abated. Although there is debate about how close this 
crisis came to conventional or nuclear war, most analysts believe nuclear weapons played 
some role. Seymour Hersh, in what many in the scholarly community have concluded is a 
sensationalized account, argues the two states were at the brink of nuclear war, with 
Pakistan having deployed nuclear weapons on F-16s that were held on runway alert.
16
 
Devin Hagerty and others claim no such alerts existed. But Hagerty nevertheless argues 
that existential nuclear deterrence (caution induced by the very existence of nuclear 
weapons or at least the ability to assemble them relatively quickly) helped to prevent the 
crisis from exploding.
17
 P.R. Chari credits the United States diplomatic mission with 
defusing the crisis.
18
 For the purposes of this article, two points are important. First, the 
1990 crisis was the second serious crisis in only three years for the two states. “U.S. 
intelligence estimated there was a 50-50 chance of war.”19 India definitely had a nuclear 
capability at this point and, given A.Q. Khan’s comments during Brasstacks, there is 
strong evidence that Pakistan had at least a fledgling capability.
20
 Vague nuclear threats 
were again part of the political communications exchanged between the two states. 
Second, whether this crisis was close to nuclear war or whether nuclear weapons 
provided a backdrop for the crisis, nuclear weapons were part of the calculus present 
during the crisis. From the Pakistani security establishment’s perspective, they were 
threatened by a conventionally superior power, one that had convincingly defeated 
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Pakistan three times in the past, and yet Pakistan was able to stand that power down, at 
least in part through veiled nuclear threats. “The restraint imposed by the nuclear factor 
on the conventional military confrontation between India and Pakistan was all too 
obvious.”21 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was thus validated for the second time 
in only three years. 
 Some have claimed that after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 India prepared for 
preemptive strikes against Pakistani nuclear facilities. At least one source claims that in 
response, Pakistan deployed Ghauri ballistic missiles to stress its ability to retaliate. Some 
have even said the missiles were mated with nuclear warheads. The preemptive strike did 
not occur and, if the Ghauri’s did deploy, this would again indicate to Pakistani 
authorities that the weapons have utility.
22
 
 The next severe crisis occurred in 1999 in Kargil. Observers believe the Kargil 
crisis arose out of Pakistani military attempts to negate India’s seizure of the Siachin 
Glacier in 1984. At Kargil, Pakistani controlled forces occupied high mountain positions 
on India’s side of the Line of Control that Indian had abandoned for the winter months. 
Control over these positions would allow Pakistan to interdict supply lines to the Siachin 
Glacier.
23
 India learned of Pakistan’s presence in May 1999. Many analysts believe that 
Pakistan’s military presumed India would not risk a serious conventional conflict with 
Pakistan in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. At the same time, Pakistan’s government 
hoped the danger created by this crisis would bring about international intervention to 
resolve the larger Kashmir dispute on terms favorable to Pakistan. Some of Pakistan’s 
calculations appear to have been correct. India did not horizontally escalate and strike 
Pakistan elsewhere (though India did deploy troops elsewhere). But India did attack 
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Pakistani forces at Kargil. While both sides suffered significant casualties (over 1,000 
dead in total), India was eventually able to dislodge Pakistani forces.
24
 Indian forces did 
not however attack Pakistani forces over the LOC and limited their attacks to the 
immediate Kargil area. But the international support Pakistan had hoped for was not 
forthcoming. To the contrary, the United States intervened politically and brokered a 
Pakistani withdrawal. 
 Much has been written about the application of the stability/instability paradox in 
the Kargil context. The arguments are somewhat confused because they ultimately rest on 
antecedent assumptions about whether or not the strategic (i.e., nuclear) situation is 
indeed, stable or unstable at its heart. Nevertheless, regional scholars often argue that 
Kargil is an example of the stability/instability paradox whereby the stability evoked by 
the existence of nuclear weapons (and the concomitant undesirability of engaging in the 
sort of serious conventional conflict that could lead to a nuclear exchange) also made 
lesser forms of conflict (such as Kargil) attractive to Pakistan.
25
 The argument claims 
Pakistan, as a revisionist power, sought to change the status quo by seizing Kargil and 
then daring India to take a risk in conventionally escalating, as Pakistan believed would 
be necessary to evict its forces from Kargil. In essence, nuclear weapons provided cover 
for low intensity conflict. Significant escalation would have risked nuclear war and 
Pakistan felt India would not take such a risk. Once again, Pakistan is alleged to have 
made nuclear threats during the crisis to underline the danger of escalation.
26
 Sources 
indicate no fewer than 13 threats between officials of the two states from 26 May to 30 
June.
27
 Pakistani leadership further felt that the international community would quickly 
intervene to avert nuclear crisis and allow Pakistan to keep its gains. As it turned out, 
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India managed to restore the status quo ante without significant escalation. India gained 
the upper hand militarily and won international support, which in combination led to 
Pakistan’s withdrawal. But for Pakistan’s military, this once again showed the value of 
nuclear weapons in staring down its more powerful opponent. Even if Pakistan was 
forced to back down in this case, just as clearly nuclear weapons seem to have prevented 
Indian escalation and thus again proved their worth.
28
 From Pakistan’s point of view, 
without nuclear weapons India would surely have escalated conventionally, both to 




 Though the resolution of Kargil initially reduced violence in Kashmir, tensions 
soon increased once more. The 2001-2002 Border Confrontation crisis began on 13 
December 2001 when terrorists supported by Pakistan’s ISI (Jaish-e-Mohammed and 
Lashkar-e-Taiba militants) attacked the Indian Parliament.
30
 In fact, the precursor to this 
attack was a 1 October 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. As 
a result, India deployed at least 500,000 troops on its border with Pakistan including 
significant offensively oriented assets, as well as air and naval forces.
31
 Pakistan’s 
military deployed its forces in response. By early spring US intelligence officials were 
publicly voicing concerns over war in Southwest Asia. There was, of course, an 
associated risk of nuclear escalation in the region, either by design or mistake. In fact, on 
14 May 2002 families of Indian military personnel were killed in Kaluchak by terrorists. 
This is exactly the sort of spark some feared could lead to war and perhaps eventual 
nuclear use. But there was no significant escalation of the ongoing crisis. As in other 
Indo-Pakistani crises of the late 20
th




 “These nuclear signals were multiple in kind, carried out at multiple 
levels, and addressed to multiple constituencies – internal, regional, and international.”33 
A combination of existential deterrence and US mediation helped to deescalate the crisis.  
 For purposes of this article, two different though not necessarily contradictory 
conclusions can be drawn from the 2001-2002 crisis. First, the existential deterrence 
generated by the presence of nuclear weapons seems to have induced caution on both 
sides, but perhaps more so in India than Pakistan.
34
 Second, there remains a very real 
chance of nuclear use in the region given the propensity of each side to resort to nuclear 
saber rattling and other regional factors that may serve to weaken restraint at critical 
junctures of some future crisis as discussed below (for example, deficiencies in 
Pakistan’s arsenal, societal weaknesses in Pakistan, religious extremism, and so forth). 
Though these conclusions seem contrary, it may instead be that a sort of especially fragile 
existential deterrence exists in Southwest Asia that is susceptible to failure at some 
critical but unknown future juncture. Each of the recent four Indo-Pakistani crises, 
Brasstacks (1986-1987), Kashmir (1990), Kargil (1999), and 2001-2002, involved 
numerous nuclear threats and only eventually ended with external mediation. Indeed it 
may be that US diplomacy is especially important and a failure to intervene 
diplomatically in the future could precipitate nuclear war. US diplomacy may have 
maintained this fragile existential deterrence. Of course, other variables could also cause 
a failure of nuclear deterrence, such as accident, miscalculation, or a loss of control over 
the weapons. An examination of current developments in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program should give one pause for thought: Pakistan is developing a large, usable, and 
modern arsenal, but one without the safety mechanisms and crisis tolerance other large 
 11 
arsenals include. Before examining these specifics, however, there is one final 
environmental variable that needs to be examined. 
LINKS TO ISLAMIC TERRORISM 
 Pakistani society has proven a fertile breeding ground for Islamist terrorism. 
Some of the reasons for this terrorism can be traced to Afghanistan and Kashmir. But the 
growth of the phenomenon also rests with the decisions of Pakistan’s government (of 
course the policies of other states are also a causal variable). 
 Pakistan has used Islam as a domestic mobilizing factor since the state’s 
inception. But the growth of violent Islamists really began when the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan supported the Afghan Mujahideen 
almost from the beginning. The United States quickly ascertained that here was an 
opportunity to bleed the Soviets, and thus supported Pakistan’s efforts with money, 
weapons, and advice. Pakistan and the Mujahideen both used Islam to rally international 
support – the war was fought as jihad against the infidel Soviets. The viciousness of the 
conflict further radicalized these Islamic warriors, as did the influx of Arab radicals 
whose home countries thought Afghanistan a good dumping ground for troublemakers.
35
 
Once the Soviets were evicted, the Mujahideen turned against one and other. The 
ongoing instability in Afghanistan worried Pakistan, so it helped to form and support the 
Taliban, who eventually swept the other warlords from power. Pakistan thus achieved 
some measure of “strategic depth” in its rear vis-à-vis India as well as a steady stream of 
radicals for use elsewhere, such as Kashmir. 
 Another key linkage between Pakistan and Islamic terrorism exists in Kashmir. 
Though Pakistan has been loath to directly confront the conventionally superior India, it 
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has supported Kashmir rebels to a lesser or greater extent for years.
36
 Since 1990 in 
particular, Pakistan has facilitated terrorism against Indian interests in Kashmir. And 
Pakistan has again mobilized on the basis of Islam. The Pakistani Army finds a key 
source of domestic legitimacy in its support for Kashmir insurgents.
37
 This Pakistani 
support has led to numerous crises, some of which have been examined above. But it has 
also managed to keep pressure on India and has internationalized the crisis in a way that 
Pakistan thought might encourage resolution.
38
 
 Both of these groups of terrorists, though once serving their Pakistani masters, 
have proven somewhat harder to control when their interests diverged from those of 
Pakistan. So by 2005 Pakistan no longer controlled its frontier regions bordering 
Afghanistan, having ceded these to Taliban friendly militants or otherwise violent, Salafi 
jihadist and/or Deobandi influenced groups. Similarly, Kashmir rebels sometime seem 
intent on achieving their own agenda without regard for Pakistan’s goals. 
 The Pakistani environment (religiously, politically, and otherwise) is complex and 
unstable. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program can best be understood as nested within 
this social environment. As such, the characteristics of Pakistan’s program could either 
reduce instability (perhaps through a clear increase in existential deterrence) or it could 
further destabilize an already fragile environment. When one examines the various 
characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, it becomes apparent that most 
(though not all) factors mitigate in favor of further instability. This instability has 
negative implications for US security interests. 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS PRODUCTION 
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 Pakistan has a broad and well-developed nuclear infrastructure that has been 
assisted variously by the US, by Europe, and most significantly by China.
39
  It has 
indigenous uranium mines and uranium mills with which to produce yellowcake. The 
yellowcake is fed into a local hexafluoride (UF6) conversion plant. Thereafter it can 
placed on one of two paths: weapons grade uranium (highly enriched uranium – HEU) or 
plutonium. 
 Pakistan produces HEU at one or more gas centrifuge facilities.
40
 The largest of 
these enrichment facilities is located at Kahuta. Secondary facilities, possibly focused on 
research or training, are located at Sihala, Golra Sharif, and maybe Gadwal (near Wah).
41
 
From there, the HEU is sent into the weaponization process, including the formation of 
pits, triggers, and other key mechanisms. Significant portions of this process may occur at 
Kahuta and Wah. Pakistan is thought to be capable of producing between 55 and 95 kg of 
HEU per year. Most open sources indicate Pakistan’s HEU based nuclear weapons are 
implosion devices requiring between 15 and 20kgs of HEU per core. While Pakistan has 
historically had greater success enriching uranium rather than extracting plutonium, it has 
maintained a duel track approach, attempting to master both processes in order to give 
itself more options for the production of nuclear weapons. 
 For Pakistan’s plutonium line, the yellowcake is fabricated into reactor fuel for 
Pakistan’s heavy water reactors. The fuel is fabricated at Kundian and possibly near 
Chashma as well. Pakistan is capable of producing the heavy water necessary to moderate 
these reactors. The heavy water production facility is located at Multan. There may also 
be a facility in Khushab. The heavy water reactors associated with plutonium production 
are located at Khushab (Khushab-1). Khushab-1 is thought to produce about 10kgs of 
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plutonium per year. Throughout the 1990s the Khushab-1 (40-50 megawatts thermal) 
reactor produced spent fuel which was then taken to a reprocessing plant known as “New 
Labs” in Rawalpindi. New Labs was able to chemically separate about 10-20kgs of 
plutonium annually using the PUREX method.
42
 It therefore appears that Khushab-1 
produces just about as much spent fuel as New Labs can reprocess.
43
 It should be noted 
that Khushab-1 can also produce tritium, which can be used to boost the yield of certain 
weapons and otherwise refine nuclear weapons. 
 A second heavy water reactor has been under construction at Khushab (Khushab-
2) since 2000.
44
 Although some analysts initially speculated that Khushab-2 might be a 
1,000 megawatt thermal output reactor, most analysts now argue the reactor is not nearly 
so large.
45
 Still, it is unclear from open sources whether Khushab-2 will be similar to 
Khushab-1’s 50 megawatt thermal output (as some US government officials have 
asserted) or will be somewhere between 70-130 megawatt thermal output (as some 
private analysts have argued).
46
 Whatever the case, this represents at minimum a 
doubling of Pakistan’s plutonium production possibilities. The problem for Pakistan is 
that New Labs may already be at or near maximum capacity.
47
 Thus it is likely that an 
expansion of an existing facility or a separate reprocessing facility is necessary. Pakistan 
may be doing both by expanding the New Labs facility and restarting construction at 
Chashma, the site of a terminated 1970s French reprocessing facility.
48
 Construction on 
the new Chashma reprocessing facility began about the same time as Khushab-2.
49
 The 
Chashma reprocessing facility under construction may have the capability to reprocess 
fuel in excess of that which will be produced by Khushab-2.
50
 Indeed, a third heavy water 
reactor, Khushab-3, is also under construction.
51
 Though Khushab-3 was also once 
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claimed to be in the “several hundred megawatts thermal” area, most analysts seem to be 
settling for somewhere between 50-100 megawatts thermal.
52
 Whatever the precise 
capabilities of these new reactors, there is little doubt that Pakistan will soon, at a 
minimum, double its plutonium production capabilities. Once Khushab-3 comes on line, 
that capacity will grow further.
53
 Of course, at some point Pakistan’s ability to produce 
enough heavy water for these facilities will come under strain, so we might expect to see 
an expansion of capabilities in this area as well.
54
 Plutonium allows Pakistan to diversify 
its nuclear weapons arsenal, to create lighter weapons (possibly for use on cruise 
missiles, see below), to create greater yields, and eventually may lead to a thermonuclear 
capability.
55
 In particular, the increase in plutonium production presages a move toward 
more reliance on missile delivery systems, because plutonium weapons can be made 
smaller than HEU based weapons.
56
 
 Understanding the number and type of HEU and plutonium production facilities, 
as well as when they became operational, allows one to make educated guesses about 
how much weapons grade material has been produced by Pakistan.
57
 These numbers are 
necessarily ranges because we cannot be sure about the capacity at which each facility 
has been operating. It is estimated that Pakistan is able to enrich between 80-140kgs of 
uranium per year at Kahuta, or enough to produce 4-8 bombs per year. It is estimated that 
Khushab-1 produces 10-20kgs of plutonium per year, or enough for 2-3 plutonium 
weapons per year. Of course, Pakistan may be using uranium and plutonium in the same 
weapon. The range of HEU and plutonium produced in total by Pakistan runs from 1175 
– 2020 kg and 95 – 115 kg, respectively.58 It is typically estimated that Pakistan’s HEU 




 Thus, at the beginning of 2008 a number of open sources estimated Pakistan had 
around 60 nuclear weapons, and perhaps additional HEU that could be weaponized.
60
 By 
late 2009 however, analysts had increased that number to between 70-90 warheads.
61
 It 
should be noted that at various times unnamed government sources have claimed 
Pakistan’s arsenal is significantly underestimated in the open literature.62 It is also often 
unclear from the open literature whether estimates apply to weapons grade material or 
finished cores.
63
 This article estimates that as of January 2010 Pakistan has enough 
weapons grade material for between 100-158 weapons, with a narrower (and more 
speculative) estimate of 123-129 warheads (see notes 58 and 62 for further discussion). It 
is ultimately unclear precisely how much of the material has been fabricated into the 
cores and constituent elements of the weapons, though this article errs on the side of more 
weapons due to the worst case scenario planning associated with nuclear security. 
Finally, it is believed that Pakistan maintains its weapons in a disassembled state, with 
the core separate from the non-nuclear explosives. 
 Conclusions about the impact of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production complex 
on larger issues of stability are mostly negative. First, the complex is itself nested in an 
unstable environment, which implies multiple and sometimes unseen opportunities for 
error. Second, the program is undergoing rapid growth, which again opens the door to 
accident and unforeseen consequences. Moreover, the arsenal itself is probably larger 
than generally thought, increasing the opportunity for losing control over one or more 
weapons. On the positive side, the weapons are thought to be unassembled. One would 
assume this is preferred by the United States, though unassembled warheads may be 
destabilizing in time of crisis (as well as easier to steal). Recent developments within 
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Pakistan’s delivery systems add yet again to at least the short term instability generated 
by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DELIVERY SYSTEMS 
 Pakistan has assorted methods for delivering its nuclear weapons. It is suspected 
of having modified at least 32 F-16s to deliver nuclear weapons. The primary advantage 
of the F-16 for Pakistan is its long range. But increasingly Pakistan is developing missile 
delivery systems, both ballistic and cruise. Pakistan’s operational missiles do not 
currently have the range of the F-16, but Pakistan has missiles entering deployment that 
exceed the F-16s range. It can be anticipated the Pakistan will retain its F-16 delivery 
option in order to maintain flexibility, but will increasingly depend on its missile delivery 
options because of their greater ability to penetrate to the target.
64
 
 Although Pakistan may also have modified its Mirage V and A-5 aircraft to 
deliver nuclear weapons, the F-16 is the most survivable of its aircraft and thus probably 
the primary platform for air delivered weapons. The F-16 has a range of 1,600 km and a 
payload of 5,450 kg. Under a 2006 agreement with the United States Pakistan is to 
receive 36 more F-16s.
65
 
 Pakistan’s missile program includes three operational, nuclear-capable ballistic 
missiles, one ballistic missile apparently soon to be operational, and two cruise missiles 
under development (see figure 1). Pakistan’s operational ballistic missiles include the 
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), the Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), and the Ghauri (Hatf-5). Most analysts now 
believe Pakistan has mastered the ability to miniaturize warheads for missile delivery.
66
 It 
should be noted that open sources vary greatly on the characteristics of Pakistan’s 




All Pakistani missiles carry only a single warhead. The missiles are not thought to be kept 
on operational alert, are not loaded with nuclear weapons (which themselves are not 
assembled), and are probably stored separately from the warheads during peacetime.
68
 
During crisis, the warheads would be assembled at one stage of the alert and mated with 
their delivery systems at a higher stage of alert. “Integrated teams of military personnel 
and nuclear scientists/engineers probably undertake such a task, ensuring organizational 
checks and balances, as well as ensuring that no rogue commander or scientist could act 
independently of the national command authority.”69 
 Pakistan’s oldest nuclear capable missile is the Ghaznavi, a solid fuel, road 
mobile missile with an approximate range of 300-500 km. It became operational in 1995 
and Pakistan is thought to have 30-84 of these missiles. It was derived from the Chinese 
M-11.
70
 It can carry a payload of approximately 500 kg. At least some of these missiles 
are based at Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex.
71
 It is thought that Pakistan now 




 Pakistan’s second nuclear capable missile is the Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4). The 
Shaheen-1 was derived from the Chinese M-9. This missile may come in two variants, 
one with a range of 450 km and the second with a range between 650-750 km. The first 
version has a payload of 1,000 kg, while the second is thought to have a payload of 500 
kg. The missile is road mobile and solid fueled. It became operational in 2003 but it is not 
known how many Shaheen-1s Pakistan possesses. It may be assembled or possibly 
produced at a missile plant at Fatehjung (note there are multiple spellings for this 
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location). Some sources indicate a high degree of accuracy for this missile (300 meter 
circular error probability [CEP]).
73
 
 The Ghauri (Hatf-5) is most likely actually a North Korean Nodong missile. 
Though it has the greatest range of Pakistan’s operational nuclear capable missiles (700-
1,500 km), and though it is road mobile, it is liquid fueled. Liquid fueled missiles require 
lengthy fueling procedures during which time they may be vulnerable to attack. The 
Ghauris became operational in 2002 or 2003. Pakistan is thought to have about 15 such 
missiles. It is far less accurate than other delivery systems (2,500 CEP) making it most 
useful as a city attack weapon.
74
 
 The missile of Pakistan’s future is probably the Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6). This missile 
may be derived from the Chinese M-18. It is road mobile and solid fueled. It has a range 
of between 2,000 and 2,500 km, allowing it to threaten almost all of India. It has a 
payload of 500-1,000 kg. First tested in 2004, it may have GPS guidance. Pakistan is 
believed to have 12-15 of these missiles in various stages of completion. The missile 
appears to be undergoing its initial deployment in 2009.
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 Pakistan also has two cruise missiles under development. The Babur (Hatf-7) is 
derived from the Chinese DH-10 (itself thought to be a reverse engineered copy of a US 
Tomahawk cruise missile that crashed in Pakistan during the 1998 US cruise missile 
attack on Afghanistan).
76
 The Babur has a range of 500-700 km and a payload of 450 kg. 
It is solid fueled and is probably ground launched, though other sources indicate an air 
and sea capability.
77
 If it can indeed be deployed on Pakistan’s Agosta submarine, it will 
provide Pakistan with a rudimentary but seemingly secure second strike capability.
78
 This 
would bring an element of stability to what has heretofore been an unstable nuclear 
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relationship vis-à-vis India. It would also allow Pakistan to develop the beginnings of a 
triad. Pakistan is thought to have 5-10 of the Babur cruise missiles. They are highly 
accurate with a CEP estimated to be 350 meters. The missile was tested in 2005, 2006, 
2007, and 2009. 
Less is known about Pakistan’s second cruise missile, the Hatf-8 or Ra’ad.79 It is 
thought to have a range of 350 km. It is solid fueled and probably air launched. It has 
been rumored to have some stealthy characteristics. The air launch capability is important 
because it allows launch from Pakistan’s less survivable aircraft and because it extends 
the range of whatever aircraft launches the weapon. 
In conclusion, according to the open literature, Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal of 
about 70-90 weapons and more weapons grade material. It has multiple delivery options. 
Pakistan seems to be developing arsenal and delivery options to maximize war fighting 
capabilities as opposed to maximizing crisis instability. As with other variables this bodes 
poorly for regional stability and therefore also has negative implications for US 
security.
80
 Though little is known about Pakistan’s command and control system, it seems 
this element has not advanced as quickly as the weapons and delivery systems. 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMAND AND CONTROL 
 Pakistan’s command and control (C&C) systems and procedures seem less 
developed than the other elements of its nuclear weapons program.
81
 Indeed some assert 
that Pakistan made very little effort to develop its C&C or a nuclear doctrine until after it 
tested in 1998.
82
 In February 2000 Pakistan established the National Command Authority 
(NCA) to formulate nuclear policy and exercise control “over the employment and 
development of all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations.”83 Though this 
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system officially includes political leadership, the Pakistani military may well make the 
final decisions regarding nuclear use.
84
 Pakistan has reportedly adopted measures to 
avoid unauthorized or accidental use of its nuclear weapons. Procedurally, although a few 
assert Pakistan uses a “three-man rule,” most assert a “two-man rule” whereby the use of 
nuclear weapons requires the concurrent decision of two people.
85
 Personnel involved 
with Pakistan’s nuclear program are reportedly vetted by four different security 
agencies.
86
 Allegedly no single person can authorize use of nuclear weapons.
87
 
 The open literature tells us far less about technical aspects of Pakistan’s C&C 
system. It does appear that the United States has provided technical assistance to help 
secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons again unauthorized or accidental use.88 Still, it also 
seems that Pakistan has not yet developed “secure command and control systems” for its 
nuclear forces.
89
 Instead, and not surprisingly, Pakistan has chosen to focus on 
developing the weapons and delivery systems first. The problem with this approach is 
that Pakistan’s nuclear forces may be susceptible to decapitation or lack of 
communication during a war. During a crisis this may generate pressures to launch. 
These pressures will increase even more as conventional hostilities unfold. And of 
course, Pakistan does not have the mitigating factors of the early Cold War such as slow 
delivery times and long distances to target. Missile flight times between India and 
Pakistan may be as short as three minutes.
90
 There is also some evidence that Pakistan is 
using its conventional C&C system for its nuclear forces.
91
 If this is the case, it may find 
its C&C degrading more quickly than a dedicated nuclear C&C system during a 
conventional war, again creating incentives for nuclear use or possibly devolution of 
launch authority during hostilities. Alternatively, realizing that such a breakdown may 
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occur, Pakistan could pre-delegate launch authority as the crisis spins up.
92
 Many analysts 
recognize the need for better C&C.
93
 Better C&C reduces the risk of unauthorized or 
accidental war. But it is simply not possible from open sources to determine the extent of 
the need, especially in the technical area. While Pakistan has adopted procedures to 
reduce the likelihood of unauthorized or accidental use, it does not appear to have 
acquired the technical resources necessary to most fully support this policy. Similarly, 
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine does not aim to promote stability first and foremost. Finally 
questions remain about its Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), especially given the 
increasingly radicalized population from which it draws. 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
 The weapons, the delivery systems, and the command and control all serve a 
state’s nuclear doctrine.94 Unlike India, Pakistan has not released an official version of its 
nuclear doctrine in part because Pakistan sees itself as benefiting from ambiguity (see 
below).
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 Instead, analysts have discerned the outlines of a probable doctrine, while 
Pakistani government officials have occasionally seen fit to comment on doctrine, 
allowing analysts to refine their understanding. It is likely that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine 
focuses almost entirely on India.
96
 
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine rests on at least three primary assumptions. First, as 
demonstrated from the crises reviewed above, Pakistani officials believe nuclear 
deterrence has worked to prevent Indian aggression in the past and that an existential 
deterrent relationship is developing in Southwest Asia.
97
 Second, India clearly has 
conventional superiority and Pakistan lacks strategic depth, thus first use of nuclear 
weapons may be necessary for Pakistan.
98
 Third, ambiguity about what might trigger first 
 23 
use is valuable in maintaining the general peace.
99
 To some extent this approach mirrors 
the US policy during the Cold War regarding the potential first use of nuclear weapons in 
the face of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Europe. Fundamentally then, Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons are designed to deter war with India and to prevent catastrophic defeat 
should war somehow come about. There are two primary prongs to Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons doctrine. 
 Prong one identifies the major elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons doctrine. 
The doctrine may be identified as “credible minimum deterrence” or “dynamic minimum 
deterrence.”100 It is dynamic because it has no hard and fast numbers.101 Rather, the 
number of weapons necessary to maintain a minimum deterrent change as the threats 
Pakistan faces change. For example, if India increases its nuclear capabilities, Pakistan 
may need to increase its capabilities (including warhead numbers) to maintain deterrence. 
Less obviously, if India achieves some level of conventional counterforce capability, 
Pakistan may have to modify its nuclear force structure. Indeed, even if India only 
increases its conventional capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan’s conventional forces, Pakistan 
may be forced to upgrade its nuclear forces so as to maintain acceptable levels of 
existential deterrence. It follows then that Pakistan’s deterrent posture is “proportional” to 
India’s nuclear (and other) advancement. While this may make sense from Pakistan’s 
position, it is in at least one sense destabilizing. It is destabilizing because India has a 
second potential nuclear foe in China. Thus as India moves to reach acceptable levels of 
deterrence vis-à-vis China, it is in fact driving Pakistani expansion, which in turn breeds 
insecurity and further arming in India.
102
 This is the classic security dilemma leading to 
an arms race. In fact Southwest Asia is currently in the midst of a nuclear arms race. 
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Even if an arms race does not necessarily lead to war, it is still expensive and practically 
guarantees negative externalities.
103
 Moreover, there are continuing concerns about the 
security of Pakistan’s weapons and further expansion is likely to exacerbate these 
vulnerabilities. 
 The second major prong provides some hints regarding when Pakistan might use 
nuclear weapons (beyond simply responding to a nuclear attack). Lieutenant General 
Khalid Kidwai during an interview listed four times when Pakistan might use nuclear 
weapons. These were: 1) Pakistan suffers large territorial losses; 2) India destroys a large 
portion of Pakistan’s army; 3) India engages in “economic strangulation” (this may be 
referring to a blockade); and, 4) India engages in serious political destabilization.
104
 
Pakistan might also use nuclear weapons to prevent “Pakistan’s adversaries from 
attempting a counter-force strategy against our strategic assets, by effectively securing 
our strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation should such an attempt be 
made.”105 This statement is meant to deter either nuclear or conventional counterforce 
attacks by India.
106
 It is noteworthy that even as set forth above these are still fairly vague 
descriptions of what might lead to nuclear use by Pakistan. This vagueness is by design: 
Pakistan wants to create uncertainty in the minds of India’s policy makers and therefore 
maximize the benefits of existential deterrence. Retired Lieutenant General Sardar FS 
Lodi has added some specificity to what sort of military set back would almost certainly 
evoke a nuclear response. He notes that in “a deteriorating military situation when an 
Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defenses or has already breached 
the main defense line causing a major setback to the defenses, which cannot be restored 
by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no other option 
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except to use nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation.”107 Pakistan’s stated willingness 
to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict, which in turn would likely cause 
Indian retaliation and all out nuclear war, is thought to reduce the probability of 
conventional war from starting in the first place.
108
 Lodi’s statements do not reduce 
ambiguity however, because there are many other situations in which the weapons might 
be used. Even those who claim Pakistan’s doctrine excludes warfighting, note target 
options that include “a number of major Indian cities, military installations, command 
and control headquarters, battlefield targets, communications centers, etc.”109 
 There are at least two conclusions that may be drawn from what is understood 
about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons doctrine. First, while Pakistan claims there is no race 
for quantitative equality, clearly force ratios matter as do qualitative factors. Pakistan 
cannot afford to fall too far behind because this may allow India to reduce uncertainty 
and provide greater opportunity to manipulate Pakistani behavior. While this may seem 
somewhat absurd from an outsider’s perspective, one must remember that when facing a 
nuclear-armed foe almost all states (including the US) engage in worst-case scenario 
analysis. Second, Pakistan is likely to try to take advantage of asymmetries in its conflict 
with India so as to minimize India’s obvious military, economic, and demographic 
advantages. These asymmetries might include technological advantages such as mobile 
missiles, allies such as China, ambiguity in declaratory policy, and even “asymmetric soft 
power” inasmuch as militant Islam seems to be creating sympathies from the world wide 
(and Indian) Muslim community. 
 Since acquiring nuclear capability, first oblique and later explicit, Pakistan has 
avoided large-scale war with India. Pakistani authorities see this as evidence that nuclear 
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weapons work to deter aggression. But Pakistan continues to fear India economic, 
conventional, and nuclear strength. Consequently, Pakistan continues extensive 
development of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. Pakistan has done less 
to develop effective command and control for its arsenal. Less yet is known about the 
security of the weapons themselves. Thus, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is an 
immature program. This immature program complicates US policy in the region and 
beyond. 
The United States has a direct interest in the Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. 
First, since the end of the Second World War the US has provided certain collective 
goods for the international community such as an open economic system and zones of 
peace that allow for continued economic development. A nuclear war in Southwest Asia 
would do severe damage to those collective goods. Second, the US is itself engaged in a 
global war against militant Islamists, many of whom find safe haven in Pakistan. These 
militants seek to acquire and use nuclear weapons against the US and its allies. Third, the 
US is engaged in wars within two of Pakistan’s neighbors. For all these reasons, the US 
has a very direct interest in what occurs within Pakistan and especially within Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program. The following sections examine the challenges to US national 
security arising out of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as well as synergistic 
interactions between these challenges. 
CHALLENGES TO US SECURITY 
 There are at least six related challenges to US security that arise out of Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program. The challenges are as follows: 
1. The ongoing arms race in Southwest Asia; 
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2. Proliferation out of Pakistan; 
3. Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics, including but not limited to, the possibility of 
accidental or unauthorized war; 
4. War with India; 
5. Islamist influence in Pakistan and infiltration into key sectors of society; and,  
6. State failure in Pakistan. 
It is difficult to precisely rank these in terms danger. Later, this article places challenges 
on two axes (danger and likelihood) (see figure 2). Though these challenges are 
recognized in the literature, their synergistic interaction gets far less attention. Similarly, 
little is said about how these challenges are heightened by the immature nature of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. These points are important because they imply that 
the United States can mitigate some of these dangers more than is generally recognized. 
US action to further develop certain aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program could 
relieve stress on those US security interests threatened by immaturity as well as 
depressurize the synergistic nature of certain security challenges. It is these synergistic 
challenges that in fact cause the most dangerous and unpredictable threats to the United 
States.  
1. The Ongoing Arms Race in Southwest Asia 
 The question here is less one of potential and more one of the costs and 
consequences of a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. There is little doubt that a 
nuclear arms race is underway between Pakistan and India (and to a lesser extent 
China).
110
 Pakistan is engaged in expanding its ability to produce plutonium. Increased 
plutonium production points to both the quantitative addition of more warheads as well as 
 28 
the qualitative addition of higher yield and/or smaller warheads. In the long-term, it may 
indicate a desire to cross the thermonuclear threshold.
111
 Pakistan continues to enrich 
uranium and improve delivery platforms. For example, Pakistan is enhancing its missile 
delivery options. The Shaheen-2 will hold almost all of India at risk. Pakistan is also 
developing two cruise missiles. This effectively extends the range of Pakistan’s aircraft, 
improves their survivability, and increases the likelihood that the weapons will reach 
their Indian targets.
112
 India is attempting to match or exceed Pakistani capabilities, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, across the board.
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 Arms races are often claimed to start wars, though there is little evidence to 
support this contention. In the case of Pakistan, some of the primary dangers are as 
follows. First, a nuclear arms race diverts badly needed funding from social projects 
including an improved education system, economic development, health care, and other 
infrastructure. Second, any war that occurs on the subcontinent and involves nuclear 
weapons will surely kill untold millions, severely damage the world economy, and 
therefore indirectly kill more. Third, more weapons increase the likelihood of 
unauthorized access. Fourth, the arms race has created immature arsenals that are 
themselves subject to accident, unauthorized use, and/or miscalculation (see below). The 
race is occurring at the “sharp end of the spear.” But the command and control that has to 
guide the spear has been neglected.
114
 Consequently, mistakes and miscalculation, 
especially during crisis, are more likely. This fourth set of problems underscores the 
synergistic quality of the challenges resulting from recent developments in Pakistan’s 
nuclear arsenal. Somewhat counter-intuitively, an arms race that goes only half way (i.e., 
one that neglects C&C) actually increases the dangers of mistaken war and thus 
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endangers US security interests. So if US actions could enhance Pakistani C&C 
capabilities the chances of war (and other threats such as illicit seizure of weapons) might 
in reality be reduced. 
Another challenge that interacts synergistically is proliferation. Nuclear 
proliferation has allowed Pakistan to upgrade its nuclear weapons arsenal by exchanging 
nuclear weapons knowledge for other needed technology, such as delivery vehicles. Here 
US nonproliferation strategy has actually increased proliferation. Rather than limiting 
proliferation to Pakistan, the US refusal to provide Pakistan other technology forced 
Pakistan to trade with and assist the nuclear programs of states like North Korea and Iran. 
Simplistic, one dimensional and unimaginative US foreign policy (influenced far too 
often by uninformed public opinion) has bred additional security threats. 
2. Proliferation out of Pakistan
115
 
 A.Q. Khan was implicated in 2004 in a widespread nuclear technology 
proliferation ring.
116
 Though Pakistan’s government denied involvement, most observers 
believe the proliferation ring could not have existed without approval of higher Pakistani 
authorities.
117
 It seems logical that Pakistan would trade nuclear technology to Iran and 
North Korea in exchange for help with missile development.
118
 In fact, the Pakistani 
Ghauri is generally regarded as a copy of the No-Dong (North Korea) or possibly the 
Shahab 3 (Iran).
119
 Although Khan has been removed from positions of power, the United 
States has never been allowed to interrogate him. It is therefore impossible for the US to 
determine the true nature and extent of the proliferation ring. 
 Certainly many individuals associated with the ring remain at large.
120
 This 
implies that parts of the ring are dormant and subject to awakening at a later time. This 
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would allow Pakistan to begin proliferation activities again. One way this might happen 
is if the US were to again disengage from Pakistan as it has done in the past (for example 
under a Pressler Amendment decertification by the George H. W. Bush administration). 
Although a high profile relationship between the US and Pakistan probably increases 
discontent across the larger Pakistani society, the US nevertheless needs to remain close 
with the army and more moderate sectors of society. 
 If the US disengages, it should expect proliferation incentives to grow because 
Pakistan will have to find other sources from which to acquire those assets deemed 
necessary to its security needs. Pakistan can afford to forgo certain developments if the 
United States is engaged and perceived to be providing security.
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 The quid pro quo for 
such US involvement, from the Pakistani viewpoint, is the necessity to avoid more 
egregious breaches of nuclear arms control regimes. Pakistan’s military can live with this 
bargain only so long as the US provides security through engagement. 
 Of course, too much US involvement could also lead to undesired results. Overt 
and heavy handed US involvement is likely to trigger a backlash in Pakistani society 
against the United States and any cooperating Pakistani government. Rather, the US 
should increase the use of soft power, making the United States more attractive to 
Pakistan.
122
 This is a long term approach, but one that must begin immediately and take 
center-stage as perhaps the key US objective in Pakistan (along with educational reform). 
Meanwhile, unobtrusive engagement is particularly desirable. Obviously area specialists 
need to be consulted on short- and long-term engagement. But certainly training more 
Pakistani officers (and perhaps even rank-and-file) in the United States and reopening US 
universities to Pakistanis would help.
123
 One risk for the United States in becoming too 
 31 
obviously involved in Pakistan is that Pakistani society may react as Iranian society did in 
1979. 
 A revolution or state failure in Pakistan encouraged in part by too much US 
involvement would be catastrophic.
124
 Depending on the nature of such a revolution, it 
might be that the government itself would not seek to provide nuclear weapons to radical 
nonstate actors, but that elements within the now fractured Pakistani state would 
reactivate the proliferation ring and provide nuclear knowledge to untrustworthy states 
and perhaps even nonstate actors. Even if the transfer were limited to states unfriendly to 
the US, these states in turn might transfer nuclear materials to nonstate actors.
125
 And all 
of this presupposes that radicals themselves do not gain firm control of Pakistan, in which 
case they may simply provide weapons to nonstate actors directly. These eventualities 
again demonstrate the synergistic nature of these challenges. Similarly, proper US policy, 
either by reducing incentives to proliferate by providing security to Pakistan, by 
enhancing economic growth within Pakistan (especially by improving Pakistan’s 
education system), or by reducing the effectiveness of malcontents in Pakistan, would 
have positive synergistic impacts across linked policy issues.
126
 In turn, the security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex would be enhanced and threats to the US reduced. 
3. Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics, including but not limited to, the possibility of 
accidental or unauthorized war  
 Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is best characterized as an immature arsenal. For 
example, its delivery systems do not offer a secure second strike capability. Its F-16s are 
increasingly vulnerable to Indian anti-aircraft measures and/or a first strike.
127
 Its most 
effective missile, the Shaheen-2, may be in the initial stages of deployment, but is not 
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widely deployed as of this writing. As a result, the arsenal is currently unable to threaten 
with high probability much of India, and especially those areas where India’s nuclear 
weapons establishment is located. Thus to maximize effectiveness, Pakistan’s current 
arsenal must be deployed close to the border, making it vulnerable to Indian attack, and 
therefore creating a strong incentive for Pakistan to use the arsenal early or risk losing it. 




 Pakistan’s warhead cores appear to be kept separate from the detonation 
components, as noted above. But they are likely stored in close proximity to each other so 
that they may be quickly assembled during crisis. Similarly, it can be surmised that the 
delivery vehicles to which the warheads must be mated are also located close to the 
warheads. This raises questions of how easy it would be for the various components to be 
destroyed in a first strike or perhaps seized by militants. Though many scoff at the notion 
of militants seizing nuclear weapon materials, many of the weapon components appear to 
be stored in western Pakistan closer to militant sympathetic areas. Moreover, the militants 
have shown an ability to infiltrate Rawalpindi and other Punjab strongholds. It is thus not 
a foregone conclusion that the weapons are safe from militants. All of these challenges 
are heightened during any sort of crisis when the military might have to assemble and 
move the weapons, making them more vulnerable to seizure and easier to use.
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 Another problem for Pakistan’s immature arsenal is the process by which it 
moves from peacetime deployment to crisis mobilization. As others have noted, this 
transition crystallizes Peter Feaver’s “always/never” dichotomy.130 Any state wants its 
nuclear weapons to “never” be used when not authorized, but to “always” work when so 
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ordered. The two goals create tension. Pakistan apparently maintains its peacetime 
arsenal decoupled from launch vehicles and its warheads disassembled. This deployment 
status maximizes the goal of never allowing unauthorized use of the weapons (though the 
cores may be more vulnerable to illicit seizure than if mated with delivery vehicles). 
However this deployment approach also makes the weapons vulnerable to a first strike. It 
is not just the cores that are vulnerable; the other components and delivery vehicles are 
vulnerable as well. At various stages of a crisis, the weapons are apparently put on 
increasingly heightened stages of alert and at different points also assembled, coupled 
with their delivery vehicles, and finally prepared for launch. While this is supposed to be 
stepwise process reflecting slowly building alert status similar to the US DEFCON 
approach, in past crises the process appears hurried through (increasing the chance for 
accident or unintended use). Even if done in a slow and steady fashion, the movement 
from peacetime to mobilization is dangerous in and of itself.
131
 Some have argued the 
move from decoupled to coupled status may be more dangerous than simply maintaining 
deployed weapons.
132
 Beyond this, once mobilization has been achieved, while the 
weapons and delivery vehicles become less vulnerable (the “always” factor increases), 
the possibility of unauthorized or accidental use increases, as does the chance of 
miscalculation (the “never” factor decreases).133 But the problem is even more 
complicated for Pakistan than for most states because of its immature C&C system.
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 Pakistan’s strategic C&C systems are underdeveloped. Regarding control, there 
are persistent questions about the day-to-day security of the arsenal.
135
 Regarding 
command, it appears there may be “significant overlap between Pakistan’s normal 
conventional command and control structures that would be subject to attack in a large-
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scale war and its strategic command and control structure.”136 Thus Pakistan may find its 
nuclear C&C being attrited during conventional hostilities. This might force Pakistan’s 
leadership to consider ordering the early use of nuclear weapons or possibly devolving 
launch authority.
137
 Intra-war stability would be threatened in either case. Other 
destabilizing alternatives include pre-delegation or adopting a launch on warning policy. 
Some even argue launch authority has been granted to field commanders during crises.
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Beyond this crisis-centric concern, there are other endemic weaknesses in Pakistan’s 
strategic C&C structure. 
 There is room for improvement on both the procedural and the technical ends of 
Pakistan’s C&C system.139 On the procedural end, the effectiveness of Pakistan’s PRP is 
unclear.
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 The program appears rigorous and has been adapted to Pakistan’s challenges. 
For example, it pays special attention to religious fundamentalism, as opposed to 
focusing on issues like alcohol, as in the United States. Further, the Pakistanis are thought 
to recruit largely from the Punjab, “who are thought to be less sympathetic to Islamist 
ideas…”141 Still, the program is even more secretive than the US PRP and thus it is 
impossible to determine the program’s effectiveness. It is possible that the program has 
failed to completely eliminate individuals whose interests and goals do not conform to 
official Pakistan state goals. In such a case this could lead to compromised security, 
perhaps during mobilization (or during social instability). The two (or three) person 
launch rule should work effectively to prevent unauthorized launch unless the PRP has 
been seriously compromised.
142
 But the two (or three) person launch rule does nothing to 
prevent an erroneous launch order (especially if launch authority has been devolved or 
pre-delegated). Finally, the standard operating procedures for assembling weapons and 
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 It seems clearer yet that the technical end of Pakistan’s C&C system is in need of 
assistance. While the US has apparently provided some technical assistance, this 
assistance is limited by national and international law.
144
 One area in which the US has 
shared technology is physical security.
145
 But in general, it appears that the technology 
for Pakistan’s C&C system remains insufficient. The Pakistanis need assistance with 
modern communications equipment that can operate after an EMP event, they need early 
warning equipment, they need equipment that can determine where and how many 
nuclear weapons have detonated, they need state-of-the-art permissive action links 
(PALs) or similar technology, and so forth.
146
 The problem with such recommendations, 
in addition to legal, is that the Pakistanis have also been wary of sharing information that 
is necessary to make some US technology transfers (e.g., PALs) effective. Some in the 
US might also worry about transfer of technology to the Chinese or others.  
 In peacetime Pakistan’s C&C system may remain somewhat vulnerable to 
compromise by unreliable personnel or perhaps to a “bolt from the blue” attack. But 
barring massive social instability, the greatest concerns arise during a mobilization when 
the system’s procedural and technological vulnerabilities are themselves buffeted by 
synergistic forces. This article examines two iterations of Pakistan’s C&C weaknesses 
during mobilization, though others exist. 
 First, as Pakistan’s nuclear forces are deployed, they are put on what is essentially 
a hair-trigger.
147
 The problems with a nuclear hair-trigger are well known, but they are 
complicated for Pakistan because it has inadequate early warning systems. Pakistan is 
 36 
therefore in the unenviable position of being on a “blind hair trigger.” The situation is 
further complicated in that, because of Pakistan’s immature C&C, we may see pre-
delegation or possibly devolution of launch authority. Knowing Pakistan is on a blind 
hair trigger may in turn tempt India to strike first. The end result is heightened crisis 
instability, perhaps to a level never reached before in the history of nuclear conflict. 
When combined with the close proximity of India, with religious differences, and with 
historical animosity unparalleled even during the Cold War, it is not difficult to imagine 
an undesired nuclear war starting.
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 The second iteration follows the first, but presupposes an Indian conventional 
counterforce capability. It would be surprising if India did not attempt to eliminate as 
much of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex as possible during the opening stages of 
any serious conventional conflict (something larger than Kargil). In that case and 
combined with the factors set forth above, Pakistan will have an incentive to use its 
weapons and to use them early. Again, the result of this is heightened crisis instability. 
 In closing this section, it should be noted that immature arsenals may mature over 
time.
149
 If Pakistan invests in dedicated strategic C&C, if it continues to improve its 
procedures, if it can develop a secure second strike capability, and if it can increase 
weapon survivability while resisting deployment postures that encourage early use, the 
subcontinent could in the future enter a period of far greater stability: existential 
deterrence will itself solidify.
150
 For the US this implies policies that improve Pakistan’s 
arsenal in ways that address the problems set forth in the previous sentence even though 
this may be politically unpopular and legally challenging. But Pakistan will have to pass 
through troubled waters before it reaches greater stability. Synergistic interactions with 
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other security challenges during the period of immaturity, moreover, could lead to 
nuclear war.  
4. War with India  
 War between Pakistan and India would harm US national security interests in 
assorted ways, including inter alia economic costs and the implications of a large-scale 
war between civilizations. It is not difficult to imagine war breaking out between the 
states and the last 60 years have borne this possibility out.
151
  
 The crises since 1986-87 indicate that nuclear saber rattling plays a large role 
once a Southwest Asian crisis begins. Although each of the crises was serious, none 
involved large-scale, border-length violence. Thus one might distinguish between limited 
war (e.g., Kargil) or less (e.g., Brasstacks) on the one hand, and large-scale warfare on 
the other hand. While a limited war could escalate into a nuclear exchange, the greater 
concern is a large-scale war. Such a large scale war is less likely to occur, but carries 
greater danger of nuclear use were it to occur. To be sure, though a limited war could 
“slip” into a nuclear exchange through accident, miscalculation, or otherwise, it is more 
likely that such a limited war would first escalate into significantly larger-scale 
conventional violence. Consequently while any type of crisis is to be avoided, it is large 
scale conflict that carries the greatest concern.  
 Any large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan is likely to involve the use of 
nuclear weapons. Indeed India will almost certainly attempt to engage in conventional 
counterforce attacks to minimize Pakistan capabilities. Knowing this, Pakistan will have 
an incentive for early use, especially given their weaknesses in C&C. Even if the states 
successfully negotiate this stage, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine indicates it will use nuclear 
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weapons to forestall a major defeat, which would be the probable end stage in any such 
war. The synergistic combination of inherent animosity, a history of nuclear threats 
during crisis, an immature arsenal and an aggressive nuclear doctrine makes it unlikely 
the states could survive a major conflict without using nuclear weapons.  
 The question of limited war between India and Pakistan is more hopeful, though 
still generates the risk of nuclear release. Here, if Kargil is indicative, India at least has 
resolved to avoid threatening Pakistan with overt escalation. India retook the mountain 
positions at greater loss of life than might have been necessary had it escalated vertically 
(to the wider use of weaponry) or horizontally (opening a new front and forcing Pakistan 
to divert resources from Kargil). Nevertheless there is ample room for limited war to 
escalate to greater conventional conflict (with the likelihood of nuclear use then growing) 
or for some miscalculation leading to use or unauthorized use to occur. The synergies 
discussed above arise again in limited conflict. 
 Though war with India is always a concern, instability in Pakistan is a more 
immediate worry. If Pakistan were to enter a period of sustained, extensive social 
instability, violent Islamists would almost certainly play a central role. The likelihood of 
violent Islamists negatively impacting the nuclear weapons complex will most likely 
depend upon their influence over three key sectors of Pakistani society. 
5. Islamist influence in Pakistan and infiltration into key sectors of society  
 Although Pakistani society is complex, this section focuses on Islamist influence 
within three sectors of society that have unique connection with the county’s nuclear 
weapons program: the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (the ISI), the military, 
and nuclear weapons scientists and technicians. Open sources do not provide much data 
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regarding the depth of Islamist influence on these three sectors, though certainly Islamist 
influence exists. This article distinguishes between infiltration, which implies deeply 
committed Islamists holding key positions within a given sector, and sympathy for 
Islamists’ views from within a given sector, which implies less commitment, but the 
potential for individuals within a sector to support certain Islamist goals. Infiltration 
opens the way for direct cooperation with Islamists. Sympathy makes indirect support 
more likely. Infiltration is discussed first. 
 Each of the three sectors examined has suffered some level of infiltration by 
Islamists. The evidence is least clear in the case of the ISI. Though undoubtedly members 
of the ISI are sympathetic to Islamists (see below), the extent to which Islamists have 
infiltrated the ISI and can therefore provide counterintelligence opportunities, or even 
influence operations, is simply unknown. Examples that indicate some level of 
infiltration include those like the 4 September and 24 November 2007 attacks on buses 
carrying ISI employees. These attacks imply inside knowledge of the bus routes and 
passengers. Similarly other attacks on the ISI imply inside knowledge, though this 
knowledge could probably have been provided by low level ISI employees or even 
through careful surveillance. It has been noted elsewhere that some ISI operatives may be 
assisting Islamists and even Al Qaeda.
152
 The suicide bombing attack on the Indian 
embassy in Kabul (July 2008) is noteworthy as are the Mumbai attacks (November 
2008). Finally, a number of ISI employees have been purged from the agency as a result 
of sympathies toward militant Islamists.
153
 At some point sympathy turns into active 
support, which thus suggests infiltration. Alternatively, the US and the ISI have 
cooperated for a number of stunning intelligence successes in Pakistan, especially against 
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Al Qaeda (though far few successes have occurred in recent years).
154
 Pakistan’s tacit and 
sometimes overt assistance to the Taliban in its Afghan insurgency is widely thought to 
emanate from the ISI, though this may be more indicative of a foreign policy goal (an 
Afghanistan hostile to India) rather than infiltration of the ISI by Islamists. 
 There is more data on the level of Islamist infiltration into Pakistan’s military. 
Certainly the links between the military and violent Islamists strengthened during the war 
with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as well as since the 1980s in Kashmir. It is 
reasonable to assume that some in the military are active Islamists as well. During the 
General Zia ul Haq years some even spoke of a “military-mullah alliance.”155 Since 9/11 
there have been purges of senior military leaders who were also Islamists.
156
 But one 
cannot eliminate the infiltration of decades in a few short years. To wit, former officers 
have been arrested in raids on militants again indicating infiltration of the military. 
Additionally, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed “was captured in the ‘safe house’ of a serving 
military officer with close family links to the Islamist political party Jamaat-I-Islami… 
having previously been kept, moved and protected by a network of Pakistan military 
officers linked only by their Islamist beliefs.”157 At least two assassination attempts on 
Musharraf were alleged to have inside military assistance.
158
 It seems clear there has been 
significant infiltration into at least the junior officer corps and rank-and-file.
159
 Recent 
attacks in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and on military bases also imply inside assistance.
160
 
Moreover, as Pakistani society has become more accepting of Islamists views, so too 
would be those conscripted into the military from this society. This may be particularly 
true of the roughly one-quarter of the military (including 15-22% of the officer corps) 
made up of Pashtuns (the same ethnic group straddling the Pakistani/Afghan border and 
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providing the bulk of the membership to the Taliban).
161
 Pashtuns have been especially 
Islamized by Pakistani state policy over the last 30 years. Thus they provide a fertile 
source of likely Islamist infiltration, at least at the rank-and-file level of the military. 
Pashtuns also make up a significant proportion of Frontier Corp personnel who serve in 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
162
 This ethnic division presents the 
potential for a split within the military, though this is not thought likely by most analysts 
at this point. Similarly, officers who rose “through the ranks in the post-Zia era” are 
likely to have faced greater Islamist influence.
163
 All of this indicates not just sympathies 
for Islamists, but the prospect that Islamists now occupy increasingly important positions 
within the military – that they have truly infiltrated the military. But there is contra 
evidence as well. 
 The military and especially the officer corps should be expected to be anti-
Islamist because increased Islamist power would reduce military power. In particular, the 
upper-level of the officer class has benefited greatly from its military service. Heads of 
universities, key government positions, and key bureaucratic positions are each a de facto 
benefit for senior military service.
164
 These benefits would disappear with a significant 
increase in Islamist power, thus we can expect the military to attempt to prevent 
infiltration that might weaken the military. Similarly, recent attempts on the lives of key 
military officials are likely to make the military itself wary of potential Islamist 
infiltration. Furthermore, the military sees itself as the guardian of the Pakistani state. To 
the extent that an Islamist take-over threatens that role, it should be expected that the 
military would attempt to limit Islamist influence.  
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 The status of Islamist infiltration into the nuclear weapons establishment is less 
clear. Certainly the establishment was infiltrated into its upper echelon of scientists at one 
point. A.Q. Khan and others have made their affinity for Islamists’ concerns clear. Top 
level scientists, including Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Majid Ali visited Al Qaeda 
when the Taliban held power in Afghanistan. These individuals may have recruited 
scientists from the nuclear weapons complex.
165
 On the other side of the ledger, 
Musharraf purged the nuclear weapons establishment after 9/11. Current civilian 
leadership seems to appreciate the danger of militant Islam, as does Army Chief of Staff 
Kayani. Additionally, employees have been reassigned and/or terminated under 
Pakistan’s revamped PRP, though how effective this program is in an increasingly 
“Islamist-sympathetic” society is unclear. It is thus ultimately difficult to discern the true 
extent of infiltration here, though it is probable that infiltration continues. 
 Societal sectors may not have been thoroughly infiltrated, but may still have 
sympathies for the Islamists’ agenda. For example, it seems clear that there is notable 
sympathy for Islamists within the ISI.
166
 The ISI has long used Islamists to support its 
agenda in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The ISI played a key role in the very creation of the 
Taliban.
167
 The ISI has also been alleged to have helped rebuild Islamist militants in 
Northwest Pakistan after the United States toppled the Taliban regime. The ISI has not 
been “proactive” in providing the West with intelligence, has been “unhelpful in relation 
to specific investigations – most notably 7/7 and 21/7…” has “restricted or denied the 
US/UK access to many alleged terrorists…” and may even “misdirect” Western 
intelligence services.
168
 The ISI is sympathetic to Islamists because Islamists further ISI 




 Yet, the ISI also played a key role in capturing Al Qaeda operatives including 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
170
 Thus it may be somewhat useful to distinguish between 
ISI sympathy for the Taliban and similar “regional Islamists” on the one hand, and 
international Islamists such as Al Qaeda, on the other hand.
171
 Still, even support for 
regional Islamists may threaten Pakistan’s stability and therefore put its nuclear weapons 
at risk with attendant perils to US national security.  
 Radical Islamist groups provide a key regional foreign policy tool for Pakistan 
and the ISI. These militants are perceived as valuable in promoting ISI goals in 
Afghanistan and Kashmir. The ISI is loath to abandon such tools when US long-term 
support could wane.
172
 Moreover, close relationships have been built between the ISI and 
the militants in support of regional goals and more than a few ISI members agree with the 
long-term ideological goals of the militants.
173
 A key question then is whether the 
militant attacks on the ISI and the broader Pakistani state could so alienate the ISI that it 
throws its lot in with the West. At this writing, though elements within the ISI recognize 
the dangers posed by radical Islamists, they continue to be wary of cooperation with the 
West, on both pragmatic and philosophical levels. Pragmatically, any association with the 
West and especially the US is profoundly unpopular with the Pakistani masses. 




 Pakistan’s military, too, has a mixed record of sympathy for Islamists.175 On the 
pro-Islamist side of the ledger, the military has a long history of supporting Islamists to 
further its domestic and international ambitions. These connections are viewed “as a 
hedge against abandonment by Washington.”176 A significant number are thought to 
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sympathize directly “with the politics of Salafist Islamism.”177 Furthermore, the military 
has repeatedly shown an unwillingness and/or inability to assert control over northwest 
Pakistan. Moreover, the military recruits from an increasingly radicalized society, 
indicating its personnel may be increasingly radicalized (not just Pashtuns). Such troops 
have shown a disturbing proclivity to surrender without fighting in the tribal areas. 
Finally, the military was cutoff from the US between 1990 and 2002. Even now, the level 
of US contact with the Pakistani military remains low.
178
 Previously, contacts between 
Pakistan’s military and the United States tended to moderate the Pakistani military, 
especially among the officer corps that was able to train with the US. 
On the other side of the ledger, the Pakistani Army attacked the Islamist held Red 
Mosque (though admittedly this attack was carried out primarily by elite units thought to 
be least susceptible to Islamists). In 2008-2009 the military began a more systematic 
effort to rid the tribal areas of anti-government forces including foreign fighters and at 
least some elements of the Pakistani Taliban. As a result, the military has found itself 
increasingly targeted by militants (October 2009). Sympathy for violent Islamist views 
may wane as a result of these attacks. In fact there is evidence that the military views 
itself as increasingly threatened by Islamism.
179
 Senior officers with Islamist leanings 
were purged by Musharraf.
180
 Moreover, the military has benefited economically through 
its control of the country and is not likely to relinquish such control (and wealth) to 
anyone, democrats or Islamists.
181
 
 There is also evidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment has some 
sympathies for Islamists. Some scientists have had connections with radical Islamists. It 
is likely that these scientists also attempted to recruit other Pakistanis scientists to assist 
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militants or at least engaged in Islamist proselytizing.
182
 The problem may be exacerbated 
by a lack of access to Western education institutions. 
On the other hand, the government has removed a number of Islamist-oriented 
scientists. Moreover, personnel security has been heightened within the program, as well 
as physical security. Better auditing procedures have been introduced and export controls 
have been improved.
183
 Given the Pakistan’s perception of the threat posed by India, 
however, it is doubtful that attempts to remove such Islamist influences go so far as to 
reduce the program’s effectiveness. Put another way, the efficacy of the nuclear weapons 
program surely wins out when weighed against Islamist influences. 
 The question arising out of this conjecture is how will these institutions react to 
increasing social instability? Infiltration of these institutions, or sympathies from within, 
both imply that Islamists could find willing allies during times of social upheaval. But 
infiltration implies a more overt role on behalf of the institution serving Islamists, while 
sympathies imply more passive acquiescence. In the case of the ISI or the military, this 
could be a key tipping point. Assistance from military units securing nuclear weapons is 
especially worrisome. In the case of the nuclear weapons establishment, social volatility 
could lead to the leakage of weapons and/or technology. Or perhaps insiders could assist 
in breaching security measures, such as by disabling PALs. Here, one example of 
negative synergy is an immature arsenal driven forward during an arms race and nested in 
social instability. 
6. State failure in Pakistan  
 The radicalization of Pakistani society is not limited to the tribal areas but is a 
countrywide phenomenon. The number of madrassas had, by one estimate, expanded 
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from 7,000 in 2000 to 13,000-14,000 in 2006.
184
 While by most accounts a large majority 
of the schools do not all produce jihadists, it seems clear that a number of the schools do 
and even more advocate a world-view that is distinctly hostile to the West. Government 
attempts to “reorient the curricula of many of these Madaris away from jihadi 
radicalization have largely failed with around 35 percent of the Madaris still not even 
registered under the government scheme.”185 Perhaps more importantly, the government-
run and privately-run schools also have an intolerant and anti-Western curriculum. The 
radicalization of Pakistani society is most notable though in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s 
government has essentially abandoned its polio elimination campaign due to resistance 
by militants.
186
 The US presence in southwest and Central Asia surely contributes to the 
radicalization of local society, especially among Pashtuns about whom observers often 
speak of “creeping Talibanization…”187 This results in the possibility of “’Pashtun 
nationalism fusing with Islamism...’” increasing the likelihood of international jihadists 
rather than only regional jihadists.
188
 Already Pashtun jihadists in the Afghan border 
areas are making common cause with Punjabi jihadists originally focused on Kashmir 
and India.
189
 In addition to Islamist support among the people, those areas that enjoy 
representation in Pakistan’s parliament (such as the NWFP, as opposed to the FATA) 
often boost political leadership that is also sympathetic to Islamists such as the Taliban, if 
not Al Qaeda directly.
190
 Islam throughout southwest Asia has arguably become less 
tolerant.
191
 Even in the more urbane areas such as Quaid-e Azam University in 
Islamabad, “hijabs and burqas have increasingly become the norm…”192 And as the 
radicalization of society increases, the strength of the central government wanes. As a 
result we repeatedly see the central government attempting to make deals with militants 
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in the tribal areas. The government also assents to Islamists demands in order to appease 
Islamists or to bolster its own religion credentials. For example, in recent years the 
government has begun imposing Islamic studies for children earlier than in the past, 
countering moderate Islamic scholars who argued such you children could become “rigid 
and doctrinaire.” Similarly, in 2007 the “federal minister for religions affairs... argued 
that anyone who did not believe in jihad was neither a Muslim nor a Pakistani.”193 
Support for both Osama bin Laden and the sharia is high and rising in Pakistan.
194
 Some 
even argue an Islamic revolution is already underway.
195
 
 Of course one cannot be certain that Pakistan is headed for revolution or state 
failure. Even within the most radicalized areas, tribal differences exist that inhibit 
cooperation.
196
 Astute policy might accentuate these differences, rather than 
amalgamating groups. Similarly, while certainly Pashtun nationalism is rampant, it is not 
clear that this must lead to international jihad. Traditional Pashtun culture remains alive 
even as foreign and local Islamists increase their strength in the region.
197
 The trends are 
troubling, but it is not clear that the Pashtuns in particular, or Pakistani society in general, 
is unwavering in its desire to move toward an Islamic state. Thus the state may be able to 
retain the people’s support if it is viewed as serving the people.  
 Nevertheless, Pakistan is clearly becoming more unstable. The tribal areas are 
virtually ungovernable. Since the assault on the Red Mosque suicide attacks have 
occurred across the country, in urban areas as well as rural areas. These have continued in 
the face of Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas during 2008-2009. Heretofore 
untouchable entities, such as the ISI and the military now come under attack. Although 
many argue the military (and particularly the Army) can maintain control over Pakistan, 
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there is an increasingly likelihood (if still small) that the military cannot control itself; 
that its rank and file is so supportive of Islamist ideas that the Army itself may be suspect, 
as the Iranian Army was in 1979.  
 The synergistic threat from these last two sections arises first from national 
instability combined with important sectors of society (e.g., the ISI and the Army) either 
supporting Islamists or becoming paralyzed at key moments. Similarly, during great 
social upheaval, elements of the nuclear weapons infrastructure might collapse, switch 
sides, or otherwise compromise nuclear weapons security and/or technology. Any one of 
these eventualities has negative implications for US security. Moreover these variables 
could combine with other challenges such as economic meltdown or crisis with India, 
again resulting in damage to US national security, perhaps in unanticipated ways.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 The variables and complexities can be overwhelming when examining even a 
small section of Pakistan. Figure 2 places the negative eventualities on a chart, estimating 
their likelihood of occurrence and the danger caused by any given event. The chart lists 
most of these as individual and discrete events, but as this article has tried to make clear, 
the greatest danger arises from the synergistic interactions of these events. So, for one 
example, state failure combined with Islamist influence may yield the nightmare scenario 
for the United States – militant acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, a war with 
India, combined with immature arsenals may well yield multiple nuclear explosions on 
the subcontinent. Of course, there are other synergies to be examined (including, inter 
alia, severe global recession). 
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 This article has not, in large part, proposed solutions. Rather, this article has tried 
to make clear the very real dangers presented by recent developments in Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program and linked some of these to larger trends in Pakistan. There are 
solutions, but time is running short. Just as importantly, some of the most effective 
responses such as improving the United State’s image, liberalizing education, and 
“maturing” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, will take the longest to put into place. If 
any good can come from recent instability in Pakistan, it would be the recognition on the 
part of the United States that Pakistan may be the most dangerous country on earth, that it 
poses a very serious threat to US national security in the years to come, and that 
integrated solutions that take negative synergies into account are necessary now. 
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